University of New Orleans

ScholarWorks@UNO
English Faculty Publications

Department of English and Foreign Languages

Fall 2009

'Who Was It If It Wasn't Me?': The Problem of Orientation in Alice
Munro's 'Trespasses': A Cognitive Ecological Analysis
Nancy Easterlin
University of New Orleans, neasterl@uno.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/engl_facpubs
Part of the Literature in English, North America Commons

Recommended Citation
Easterlin, Nancy. "'Who Was It If It Wasn't Me?': The Problem of Orientation in Alice Munro's 'Trespasses': A
Cognitive Ecological Analysis." Studies in the Literary Imagination 42.2 (2009): 79-102.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of English and Foreign Languages at
ScholarWorks@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in English Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uno.edu.

Nancy Easterlin

“Who Was It If It Wasn’t Me?” The Problem
of Orientation in Alice Munro’s “Trespasses”:
A Cognitive Ecological Analysis
Contemporary evolutionary social science covers a lot of territory, and in
its efforts to explain how humans have successfully held their ground, one
of the few claims that enjoys consensus is this: narrative thinking is fundamental to survival. In the thinking-acting flow of human life, a blend of
sequence, causality, and agency is indispensable. Narrativity thus evinces
one sustained link between science and literature, for we think, move, and
tell stories in lines. Yet once evolutionary and cognitive literary scholars
recover from the heady feeling that their hard work connecting the divisions of knowledge has been validated, they may ask themselves, “What
next?” How does the essential nature of narrative thinking contribute
specifically to literary knowledge? Since much literary modernism is, after
all, the history of attempts to write our way out of narrative’s apparent
intransigence, further evidence of our psychic dependence on its structure
may not be self-evidently welcome or necessarily useful.
But the intransigence of narrativity does not imply its ease, and the
purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that some of our best literature
dramatizes the difficult process of establishing even the apparently ubiquitous trajectory of narrative order. In her story “Trespasses,” Alice Munro
troubles narrative thinking at the most fundamental point of orientation,
the referential origin. In the following essay, I will explain how a dynamic
model of ecological cognition extends previous work in evolutionary
literary criticism by enabling us to analyze cognitive challenges to narrativizing in process. My essay has three steps: first, I situate my ecological
approach in the context of current evolutionary literary criticism; second,
I argue that this dynamic approach explains cognition extending from realworld negotiation into literary processing; and third, I provide an analysis
of Alice Munro’s challenge to the reader’s attempt to orient (and from
there, proceed with narrative construal) in the beginning of “Trespasses.”
One theme of “Trespasses,” as of much of Munro’s longer fiction,
is the difficulty of establishing authoritative narrative accounts. In
“Meneseteung” and “The Wilderness Station,” for example, the problem of
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reconstructing a factually accurate narrative account is bound up with the
incomplete history of women on the frontier. Whereas newspaper stories
of local incidents and letters by those (typically men) seeking to shepherd
single women into respectable social life give one version of events, those
versions by women themselves, Munro suggests, have died with them, left
to the author of fiction to imagine. However, the difficulty of authentic and
complete reconstructions of events in Munro’s fiction is not, on the whole,
a problem of history, and much less of an exuberant postmodern sensibility, but of a general conviction that life is comprised of “disconnected
realities” (qtd. in Nunes 14). Even so, Munro’s fiction most often suggests
that a determinate set of events lies behind the text, but that the conflicting self-justifications of her characters undermine narrative certainty.
Familiar motives and shortcomings—the everyday dishonesty fostered by
self-interest; the inclination to suppress what is ugly and disturbing; and
the failure to exhibit a systematic sense of responsibility in our dealings
with others—animate the accounts of Munro’s characters.
Indeed, as Munro brings conflicting interests and accounts to the fore,
the desideratum of factual accuracy loses authority as the reader focuses
on ethical concerns and shapes a value- rather than event-based narrative
account from the discrepancies. Not surprisingly, then, Munro’s preoccupation with accurate accounts is not merely thematic, but informs the
structure of many of her stories, whose meandering beginnings challenge
the reader’s basic efforts at orientation. In “Trespasses,” Munro’s circuitous
delineation of the ambiguity surrounding events and the evasions that
sustain those ambiguities are a product of her delayed introduction of
the main character (and thus the orienting consciousness), a delay that
confounds the reader’s ability to prioritize and evaluate incidents and
information, and so to determine narrative relevance. Typically, readers
approach literature under the assumption that the author will provide a
speaker, a narrator, or a character to serve as a central point of reference,
focusing emotional-cognitive effort in the literary environment and, in
consequence, motivating and guiding reasoning processes in the direction
of constructing and sustaining narrative order. This is, in some respects, a
matter of convention, but as I hope to show, our readerly commitment to
what narratologists call character functions, and with them many mimetic
conventions, derives from evolved patterns of cognition (Phelan 28). In
my view, the reader’s commitment to character functions is the imaginative equivalent of a real-world self, and its absence can deprive the reader
of a vantage point for seeing, cognizing, and acting. Thus, when Munro
intentionally withholds her main character’s identity for the first six pages
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of “Trespasses,” she deprives her readers of the point of orientation (the
character function) that will prompt for and facilitate narrative construction. Munro’s goal in thus disabling event- and fact-based narrativity is to
fully reveal the psychologically disabling conditions of that main character’s life and the ethically troubling domain of her upbringing.

Synthesizing Evolutionary

and

Ecological Psychology

Evolutionary approaches to literature emerged in the United States in
the nineties, initially as a response to extreme postmodern constructionist
claims about the nature of the self, reality, language, and representation.
Since the publication of the inaugural efforts, evolutionary criticism has
become a recognized field in literary studies, diversifying in methods and
angles of approach, and in many cases joining forces with the closely
allied area of cognitive approaches to literature. Ecological psychology, a
dynamic theory of information pick up that focuses on evolved perceptual
systems, provides an important theoretical link between evolutionary
social science and cognitive neuroscience. An early contributor to the
embodiment paradigm, ecological psychology emphasizes the situated and
integrated nature of thought and action.
The term “evolutionary psychology” admits of two different uses. In the
broad use, it refers to all areas of psychology and neuroscience compatible with the theory of evolution by natural selection. In its narrow use,
it refers to those psychologists (including Leda Cosmides, John Tooby,
Steven Pinker, Margo Wilson, Martin Daly, and David Buss) who claim
that the basic architecture of the human mind was formed during the
Pleistocene in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation (EEA). During
this hypothesized major period of species evolution, domain-specific
organs and modules arose in response to specific adaptive problems in
the environment. Closely allied with although somewhat more narrow in
focus than E. O. Wilson’s sociobiology, this so-called Santa Barbara evolutionary psychology takes a Swiss army knife or modular approach to the
mind, positing that adaptations—including such things as cheater detection, mating strategies, language capacity, landscape preferences, and fear
of snakes and spiders—constitute basic components of our species nature.
As Kevin N. Laland and Gillian R. Brown note in their overview of evolutionary approaches to behavior and psychology, the concept of the EEA
at the core of Santa Barbara evolutionary psychology is, as Cosmides and
Tooby themselves acknowledge, a “statistical composite” rather than an
actual time and place. The notion of EEA adaptedness “can only be partly
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true,” a point of view that is reinforced by current research in evolutionary
biology which indicates that some evolutionary processes are much faster
than previously realized, occurring within twenty-five generations or
approximately a thousand years (Laland and Brown 181). Furthermore,
while Cosmides and Tooby themselves insist that psychological adaptations do not determine behavior, their emphasis on psychological mechanisms to the exclusion of environmental circumstances in which behaviors
are manifest tends to suggest a strong correlation between mechanism and
behavioral outcome.
In fact, theories of domain-specific cognition like that of Santa Barbara
evolutionary psychology occupy one end of a continuum, at the opposite end of which lie theories of domain-general intelligence and thus,
as Laland and Brown point out, these perspectives on psychology and
behavior are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, recent work on the evolution
of the mind in cognitive psychology and cognitive archaeology emphasizes the other end of that continuum, stressing the need for flexibility
in cognition, which is especially characteristic of the human species. As
Merlin Donald argues in The Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the
Evolution of Culture and Cognition, humans are high on intuitive knowing
and low on rules. Like Santa Barbara evolutionary psychologists, Donald
describes a mind whose architecture is highly differentiated and specialized; however, he insists that a major problem with some modular and
unitary theories of mind is that there was not sufficient evolutionary time
for some of the hypothesized modules to evolve. This is particularly the
case, for example, for a complex adaptation like language, which some
evolutionary psychologists, including Pinker, claim is hardwired into the
brain. Much current research indicates high plasticity not only in infant
but also in adult brains, such that “culture can literally reconfigure the use
patterns of the brain” (Donald 14). Moreover, Donald points out that not
all cognitive models revealed by data are necessarily bounded by genetic
evolution. Indeed, his larger argument explains how humans enjoy an
enormous expansion of cognition through the nonbiological, cultural
developments of symbolic systems that enable external storage (and thus
expanded memory capacity).
In a similar vein, Steven Mithen notes that a wide variety of psychologists try to account for varied and seemingly innate domain-specific intelligences while simultaneously acknowledging the fluidity and creativity of
human thought (Prehistory). Approaching the subject as an archaeologist
and thus basing his “cognitive archaeology” on the evidence provided
by artifacts and living arrangements at prehistoric sites, Mithen hypoth-
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esizes that humans underwent a cognitive explosion 60,000–30,000 years
ago, one that enabled the transfer of knowledge between previously discrete natural history, social, and technological mental domains. For an
extremely long period of human evolution, between 1.8 million to 100,000
years ago, large human brains apparently operated under distinctive constraints. For instance, the flake production of hand axes required great
skill, especially given the need to adjust technique in response to diverse
stone quality. Yet among the Neanderthals, technology remained extremely
conservative for about a million years. There is no evidence of tools made
of bone and antler, tools with several components, or artifacts designed for
specific activities. By the same token, whereas large brains typically correspond to high social intelligence and social complexity, archaeological
evidence suggests that the large-brained Neanderthals paradoxically lived
in small groups with little or no social structure. The cultural explosion
of the Middle to Upper Paleolithic, by contrast, includes body adornment,
cave paintings at Lascaux and in Chauvet cave in the Ardèche, and representational figurines. According to Mithen, such artworks require the
mental conception of an image, intentional communication, and attribution of meaning, blending technical, social, and natural history domains.
Like Donald and Mithen, ecological psychologists emphasize the need
for cognitive and behavioral flexibility, but they take the perspective of an
organism’s real-time negotiation of its immediate environment. Edward
Reed maintains that twentieth-century psychology has been hampered
by the “two environments” assumption, dividing a scientific psychology,
which focuses on the body, from a psychology of mental states, which
was, in Reed’s estimation, essentially unscientific until J. J. Gibson inaugurated ecological psychology in the sixties. Gibson developed ecological
psychology as an alternative to the stimulus-response model that governed
the study of sensation and perception, according to which the impulses
along nerve fibers (sensation) constituted the basis of perception. Pointing
out that the SR model only describes the process of a passive observer
and that, additionally, sensation is not the raw data of perception, Gibson
argued that psychologists needed to address the ecology of stimulation.
Basing his theory on evolutionary premises, Gibson presents a theory
of information pick up in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems,
according to which higher animals have evolved adjustable sense organs
and mobile extremities for the purpose of obtaining stimulation from the
environment. Terrestrial animals orient towards gravity and the surface of
support, and upright posture of the body is essential to the orienting of
perceptual systems, which appear to have evolved clustered around the
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head to enable exploratory activity independent of performatory activity.
According to Gibson, all perceptual systems aid locomotion and geographical orientation. The auditory system, for instance, is not simply a hearing
device; it enables detection of the direction of an event and facilitates the
organism’s orientation to it, and thus head movement is crucially integral
to it (Gibson 32–75).
In the “two environments” assumption that ecological psychology
sought to overturn, literary scholars recognize Cartesian dualism, which
sometimes correlates institutionally with the “two cultures” paradigm: one
set of procedures and type of knowledge for the humanities and another
for the sciences. Darwinian and cognitive literary critics seek to transcend
this dichotomized view of humans through a unified understanding of
mind-body processes and their relevance to the cultural artifacts our species produces. But developing and maintaining a conception of mind that
stays connected to the bodily basis of cognition is, it turns out, a rather
taller order than many of us initially supposed. Why is this so? We tend
to hide the body and the visceral responses that are the precondition and
motivation for the lowest to highest levels of consciousness. As Antonio
Damasio explains, “I could describe the hiding of the body as a distraction, but I would have to add that it is a very adaptive distraction. In most
circumstances, rather than concentrating resources on our inner states,
it is perhaps more advantageous to concentrate one’s resources on the
images that describe problems out in the world or on the premises of those
problems or on the options for their solution and their possible outcomes”
(29). Hiding the body is apparently endemic and systematic: “One of the
chief ways the body hides from our conscious awareness,” claims philosopher Mark Johnson, “is a result of what Michael Polanyi (1969) called the
‘from-to’ character of perception. All our acts of perception are directed to
or at what is experienced and away from the body doing the perceiving.
This is what phenomenologists call the intentionality of the mind” (4–5).
A simple evolutionary logic dictates the concentration of perception,
cognition, and consciousness on external phenomena. Because the great
challenges to survival come overwhelmingly from outside the individual
organism, directing attention outward serves organismic fitness, as the
evolution of perceptual systems and cognitive predispositions for environmental exploration attests.
“Hiding the body,” which lurks even in diverse evolutionary and cognitive theories based on specifically Darwinian premises, is probably an
inherent characteristic of sensate organisms, whether “hard-wired” into
cognition or the nervous system or simply an upshot of the strictures of
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living on the ground. What is especially useful in ecological psychology,
then, is its insistent focus on the chief priority of an organism dynamically
situated in a physical environment that is itself dynamic. That priority is
gathering information that will enable the organism to take advantage of
affordances (opportunities for action). Because information about predators, weather events, food, and sexual opportunities is not distributed
predictably in any natural environment, even simple organisms must be
capable of behavioral plasticity or flexibility, a feature of behavior that
Darwin demonstrated with his earthworm experiments (Reed 17). For
species with brains, and even more so for species with big brains, the
capacity for behavioral and cognitive flexibility is vastly expanded.
Ecological psychology provides an important perspective for evolutionary literary critics because, first, it reminds us that mental processes
are not merely situated in a physical body but serve that body through
forms of internal action like cognition and emotion, and second, it assumes
that the primary motivation and orientation of any organism is epistemic.
Although higher organisms are highly motivated to pursue sexual encounters and to obtain food, the basic logic of survival indicates that perceptual survey and cognitive evaluation of the environment operates as a
primary and ongoing background activity to more specific motivations.
However, even though ecological psychology adds another dimension to
the Darwinian argument for flexibility in behavior and cognition, it cannot
serve as a substitute for the other subfields of evolutionary social science
discussed here, all of which are generally compatible. One especially good
reason that ecological psychology does not provide a total answer for
evolutionary literary critics is that the psychologists in this field focus so
exclusively on perceptual response in dynamic situations that they avoid
making any inferences about mental architecture or cognition.
Fortunately, ecological psychology is neatly compatible with and serves
as part of the evolutionary rationale for the recent embodiment paradigm
in cognitive science. Just as Gibson asserted in 1966 that organisms are
both separate from and importantly continuous with the environment,
Humberto Maturana maintained in 1980 that
Living systems are units of interactions; they exist in an environment. From a purely biological point of view, they cannot be understood independently of the part of the environment with which they
interact, the niche; nor can the niche be defined independently of
the living system that occupies it. (qtd. in Gibbs 42)
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And just as ecological psychology claims that our fundamental orientation toward gravity greatly affects our perceptual-cognitive functioning,
numerous recent studies in cognition and language indicate that people
activate bodily based sources of linguistic expressions when they process
language. Rather than understanding non-literal meanings of expressions
as matters of convention, “people actually understand ‘toss out a plan,’ for
instance, in terms of physically tossing something” (Gibbs 184). In like
manner, “people interpret the meanings of fictive motion statements by
‘replaying’ the movement, reconstructing a mental enactment of movement implicit in the sentence” (190). Metaphorical expressions, in other
words, not only have a biological base, but form part of a cycle of action
and meaning construal between the physical body, the mind-brain, the
speaker or writer, and the same features of that person’s audience.
Thus, it seems, while we sit in meetings discussing a proposal for a
new building or a curriculum revision or whatever else is relevant to our
particular occupation, the bodies that seem so controlled and passive are
intimately engaged in our cognitive processing. Likewise, the information
we pick up—about the proposal, certainly, but also about the attitudes
of our colleagues, the weather outside the window, the cleanliness of the
conference room, and so on—has direct relevance to the social-physical
environment and the feasibility or acceptability of the plan that has been
“tossed out.” Even if we are strongly predisposed to think, feel, and behave
in certain ways—and I believe that in this assumption Santa Barbara evolutionary psychology is correct—our thought-and-action always materializes in the process of assessing the environment of which each individual
is also an integral, dynamic dimension.

The Cognitive Ecology

of the

Literary Environment

Does literature allow us to check out from this cycle, to forget, at least
for a short time, the body? Such an inference runs contrary to the studies
on language and cognition Raymond Gibbs cites in Embodiment and
Cognitive Science, just as it runs contrary to the “interpretive habit to preserve the mimetic” (Phelan 28). If we could switch temporarily to a mode
of cognition divorced from bodily experience, we would not resort to so
many representational dimensions in our literature, even literature in a
postmodern or experimental mode. Although the evolution of consciousness has enabled humans to transcend the episodic memory of primates
and to participate in long-range planning and hypothetical situations, our
imaginative constructions are profoundly grounded in our species nature.
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Part of that nature is a highly developed cognitive ability that enables us
to detect information, construe it in ways meaningful to our existence and,
circumstances allowing, act upon it.
Works of literature unfold in time, and works with a predominantly
narrative orientation particularly emphasize this temporal dimension. The
bodily based knowing theorized in ecological psychology and the embodiment paradigm is part of our very process of understanding the language
of an imaginative text. But I want to insist on the larger claim embedded in
my thesis: that, as readers, our entire orientation toward a fictive environment is generally not simply analogous but isomorphic to our orientation
in the material world. With so much current research in psychology suggesting that we are always thinking in terms of the relative orientation and
physiological responses of our bodies, it seems unlikely that the body can
be short-circuited in any meaningful way.
Literary narratives present readers with dynamic environments that
typically contain representations of fundamental features of the external
world, including a physical place rich in inanimate objects and living
beings. Among the latter, other humans with a distinct set of social relations are often particularly salient. Yet even though the fictive world must
have sufficient dimensions of real-world environments for readers to navigate within it, so to speak, it is at the same time a highly artificial environment whose aspects have been carefully selected, unlike those of actual
places and spaces. In everyday experience, organisms filter out an abundance of actions and entities that have no relatively meaningful claim upon
their attention. Stepping into the street, a person will attend to oncoming
traffic rather than the dead worm being eaten by ants or an inexplicably
brilliant flower lying in withered leaves by her feet. In the moment before
she crosses the street, these objects do not strike her as important stimuli
or opportunities for action if a car is barreling rapidly down the street,
and she does not attend to them. But a work of fiction is an intentionally
produced, cognitive artifact, and if a writer describes each of these features
of the environment as a character crosses the street, readers expect those
features to have some relevance to the ongoing construction of meaning
in the text. (The real woman crossing the street is likewise continuously
producing meaning, but her priorities and the bearing of her environment
on her well-being are rather different.) In offering itself to our attention as
a meaningful, humanly constructed cognitive object, a literary work leaves
us unprepared to filter out extraneous elements.
How does a reader begin to orient in a textual environment? Some of
this, of course, depends on what the writer offers, but characteristic fea-
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tures of our species psychology are prerequisite to our ability to process
textual environments, just as they are elementary to way-finding in the
real world. First among these is the sense of self. So much derided in postmodern thought, that phylogenetically evolved and ontogenetically developing sense of “me,” of the core of the organism, serves, as Damasio says,
as a fundamental point of reference (134–43). The real-world environment
as I cross the street or buy groceries or teach class is only coherent in relation to that cognitive-physiological core, which in homo sapiens sapiens is
a quite sophisticated entity, with a developed autobiographical dimension
and purposive capacities. It is only this kind of human self, “the autobiographical self,” that is a possible reader of texts, for without it animals
have no awareness of temporality and cannot refer events in the present
to the past or anticipate future events.
Writing and reading texts require consciousness, of course, which is
itself a precondition for autobiographical selfhood and the capacity to
model the self and others cognitively. Consciousness is, in Damasio’s definition, “the feeling of knowing,” a prelinguistic awareness of the organism’s interactions with external phenomena. But how does that interaction
result in such an intimation? The organism constructs “an account of what
happens” as a result of its interaction with objects, and “This account is
a simple narrative without words” (168). Put differently, the narrative
impulse is so elementary that it not only operates unconsciously but is
integral to self-identity and consciousness. Consciousness and the self, to
be plain, are bound up with narrative, and as consciousness and the self
have developed in their modern forms, stories, spoken and then written
down, provide a central vehicle for the exploration and play of consciousness.
What this drives home is that the basis of narrative, causal and sequential thought that typically incorporates some (if not all) of the features
Jerome Bruner attributes to it—actor, action, goal, scene, and agent—
evolved millions of years before advanced, compositional language.
Cognitive psychologists widely recognize that narrativity is a basic mode
of mentation, and sociobiologist Wilson claims that its core feature, causal
construal, is an epigenetic rule: a robust, built-in, cognitive predisposition
(See Bruner; Lloyd; Schank; Wilson). The developmental ecological psychologists Eleanor Gibson and Anne Pick, stressing that animacy, agency,
and causality develop over time for the infant, take the view that “causality
is a rather sophisticated concept, founded originally on learning about
control. Control is first discovered in oneself—in controlling hand movements, for example, that have the consequence of moving some object”
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(194). The infant’s grasp of agency and causality are bound up together,
and in accordance with this view, causality may not necessarily have an
innate cognitive dimension. Nevertheless, given the inevitable characteristics of species existence, narrative mentation must necessarily emerge, and
emerge early, to ensure survival. Hence, whether we judge that narrativity
is the product of epigenesis (the total results of organic qualities plus
environment) or the result of life regularly constrained by certain environment factors, the net conclusion for our purposes is the same: narrative is
fundamental to survival.
Thus far, I have suggested that autobiographical selfhood, consciousness, and narrative thought, bound up together and indispensable to realworld navigation of the environment, constitute the cognitive dynamics
basic to orienting in a literary text. Likewise, the capacity for other forms
of association serves narrativity but also promotes discernment of other
types of relations. Missing from this description, though, are other human
beings or sets of relations. There is very little literature that does not have
a significant sense of human context, whether that context is dramatized
within the text or not. In literary works without characters, such as lyric
poems, there is sometimes a silent addressee. At other times, there is a history of human relations that serves as the context of the poet’s meditations.
Sometimes the poet’s address to the reader or an anthropomorphized god
establishes the minimal human relationship.
Writing, in short, is a comprehensively social act, no matter how attenuated social interaction becomes in the process. Indeed, language itself likely
attests to the thorough-going sociality of human beings. Anthropologists
Leslie Aiello and Robin Dunbar argue that language evolved not for more
efficient and accurate dissemination of information but to promote social
cohesion when grooming—the primary mechanism for maintaining affiliative bonds—became too time-consuming as the size of humans group
increased (in Mithen, Neanderthals 135–36). Over the course of about
six million years, humans evolved from arboreal ancestors protected and
shaded by trees into a far-ranging, way-finding, knowledge-seeking species whose cognitive, emotional, and physiological make-up slowly altered
as the species sought to meet its needs for food, protection, and mates.
By about two million years ago, our australopithecine ancestors appear
relatively well-adapted to open environments; only of moderate size and
relatively visible, humans were vulnerable to bigger, faster predators and
would have been unable to protect themselves without the aid of a reasonably large, close-knit social group. Precisely for this reason, extraordinary
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sociality, like exceptional plasticity in behavior and cognition, is an adaptive hallmark of our species because it promoted inclusive fitness.
The basic characteristics of the way-finding mind—a self to serve as the
point of orientation and reference; a propensity to infer causal relations
and to make other associative connections; an environment rich in potential affordances; and a close-knit social group that provides the secure basis
for way-finding activity—still serve to orient us in human life, even though
the epistemic and geographical range of human life has expanded enormously with the rapid development of culture in the past 10,000 years.
These cognitive features inform our mode of entry into works of imaginative literature. Because narrative literature usually centers on a problem,
however, its environments typically highlight the difficulties of one dimension or another of this epistemic process. This might entail challenges to
the pick up and interpretation of information about the physical environment or its cognitive equivalents, such as metaphor and symbol, or to the
system of social relations within the text. In general, informational deficits
or imbalances will tax the reader’s effort at cognitive orientation, which in
turn will inhibit the assimilation and reorganization of that information to
an ongoing narrative account.
Like other literary works whose subject is the epistemic process,
“Trespasses” directs the narrativic impulse that initially operates below
the level of consciousness toward the conscious problem of narrative construction. In the story’s opening, however, Munro’s delayed revelation of
the story’s main character in combination with conventional features of
narrative presents readers with a territory devoid of its true and necessary
focalizing perspective, that of the ten-year-old Lauren. Meanwhile, Munro
effectively provides the narrator as an alternative (though ultimately false)
other “self” with whom readers identify. Thus standing on the perimeter
of the storyworld rather than entering actively into it, readers are deprived
of crucial information by orientational disadvantage and immobility.
Drawing on research from Darwinian psychiatry and studies of obsessivecompulsive disorder, literary scholar Michael Austin claims that the extra
energy and discomfort resulting from normal anxiety motivates the generation of internal narratives and the pursuit of closure. Not only too little
information but too much creates anxiety, and as Austin points out, in our
pragmatic mental operations, we value useful rather than necessarily true
information. Munro not only strains readers’ desire for narrative closure
by providing information that seems incidental (apparently useless) at
the outset but forestalls readers’ ability to begin sorting information and
thus shaping the narrative by refusing to establish an orienting perspective
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within the storyworld. In rendering problematical the truth that readers
are cognitively predisposed to pursue—initially, a factual account of past
events and their connection to the present—Munro redirects attention
to the self-justifications of her characters and the implications of their
stories for the submerged main character, Lauren, and her potentially
focalizing perspective. The story of her life, in fact, is one of a faltering,
or long-deferred, orientation—in other words, of an unrealized because
unrecognized self.

Territory, Orientation,

and

“Trespasses”

“Trespasses” is one of several Munro stories in which the central character is an adolescent girl whose parents and their associates live by a
lingering set of counter-cultural attitudes, which include a mild anti-establishment posture and a belief that children should be treated as adults.
While the parents are deluded in their sense of superior honesty and
freedom from conventional mores (they seem as repressive, viciously passive aggressive, and jealous as any of the usual human lot), these attitudes
help them evade the moral and ethical consequences of their actions.
The gist of the story is this: Eileen and Harry and their daughter Lauren
have recently moved to a small town where Harry has bought the town’s
newspaper. While unpacking, Lauren asks about the contents of a box
that seems particularly light, and her father gives her the first version of
some past events. Eleven years before, he and Eileen had a baby, soon after
which Eileen learned that she was pregnant. After a fight, Eileen drove
off with the infant and had an accident in which the baby was killed. The
box contains the baby’s ashes. This is just the beginning of Munro’s story,
however. Another woman, Delphine, who believes she is the biological
mother of the first (presumably illegally adopted) baby, has tracked them
down; she also assumes that the living girl Lauren (both babies were
named Lauren) is her daughter and pursues a relationship with the girl.
As Lauren gradually begins to suspect, based on Delphine’s hints and indirect revelations, that she might be adopted, Harry and Eileen learn of the
friendship that has emerged between the two. The result is the late-night
attempt to provide the canonical narrative of the past events and the hasty,
long-delayed ceremony to scatter the ashes of the baby who died a decade
before.
The thirty-seven-page story is told in seventeen sections that vary in
length from under a page to about six pages. It starts with a section covering the first part of the final scene, the four characters finding a site on
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a riverbank to scatter the ashes, and ends with the rest of the scene, the
scattering of ashes and the beginning of the ride back into town. On one
level, then, the present event of dispersing the ashes functions conventionally as a narrative frame. However, Munro develops this overt structural
circularity on more subtle chronological and psychological levels, since
the town is a place of childhood vacations for Harry, and since each adult
character, through unacknowledged feelings of guilt, responsibility, and
desire deviates from but ultimately returns to his or her version of the
past events. The story thus enacts a debased version of the myth of eternal
return, wherein the structural return to the oozy riverbank reflects the
return of each of the adult characters to his or her muddy version of the
baby’s adoption and death.
In the first six pages of the story, as I will attempt to show in what follows, the pervasive self-deceptions of Eileen and Harry govern the distribution of information in the narrative. Munro orchestrates this process
of deception at the level of narrative technique, employing an ostensibly
reliable narrator who, beguiling readers with her intelligence and charm,
surveys the narrative world and delivers a comic, apparently loosely connected, and superficial account of events. In this manner, Munro compels
readers to stand quite outside the narrative world for the first five pages,
in alliance with the narrator and without any hint that there will be an
orienting perspective among the characters. To put this in terms of my
ecological model, Munro essentially inhibits the process of information
pick up by neglecting to identify Lauren as the protagonist and by simultaneously suppressing the girl’s orienting (or focalizing) perspective, which
in consequence only belatedly initiates the imaginative correlative of the
autobiographical self (in other words, the readerly identification with
the character). For many pages, then, Munro effectively keeps readers
out of her true story, even while masking the central informational and
perspectival deficits she has strategically employed. Virtually stalled at
the perimeter because deprived of the orienting consciousness required
for full entrance into and movement within the domain of the storyworld
(or textual environment), the readers, like Lauren, lack the fundamental
point of orientation (the self) to initiate the epistemic process of narrative
construction.
Another way of putting this is that Munro’s story, like Wordsworth’s
“Simon Lee,” does not begin at the beginning of the true story, but like that
poem, begins with a sense of narrative conventionality that carries with
it a deceptive assurance of proper shape, which presumes the control of

92

Nancy Easterlin
emotion and anxiety that comes with closure and the containment of facts.
Munro’s first short section certainly promises this:
They drove out of town around midnight—Harry and Delphine in
the front seat and Eileen and Lauren in the back. The sky was clear
and the snow had slid off the trees but had not melted underneath
them or on the rocks that jutted out beside the road. Harry stopped
the car by the bridge.
“This’ll do.”
“Somebody might see us stopped here,” Eileen said. “They might
stop to check out what we’re up to.”
He started to drive again. They turned onto the first little country
road, where they all got out of the car and walked carefully down
the bank, just a short way, among lacy black cedars. There was a
slight crackle to the snow, though the ground underneath was soft
and mucky. Lauren was still wearing her pajamas under her coat,
but Eileen had made her put on her boots.
“Okay here?” Eileen said.
Harry said, “It’s not very far off the road.”
“It’s far enough.”
Noting that narratologists and writers have long stressed that there
are always related events prior to the start of a formal narrative, Brian
Richardson concludes that “there is no ready formula for ascertaining the
actual beginning of the story,” and that judgments about where a narrative
begins proceeds on a case-by-case basis (117). In this case, Munro offers
up a balance between certainty and uncertainty that persuades readers
that they will soon be on the way to constructing a reasonable sequential
narrative that explains the mysterious activity of the characters in the
initial scene. First, the narrator provides not only the names of the four
characters but describes where they are sitting in relation to one another
in the car. The fact that Lauren is wearing pajamas and that “Eileen had
made her put on her boots” establishes that Lauren is a child and that
Eileen is most likely her mother or guardian. Likewise, the exchange about
an appropriate place to stop suggests that Harry and Eileen are partners.
Although Delphine’s relationship with the others is as yet undisclosed,
this omission is not initially troublesome, because Munro has introduced
her characters and sketched relationships to which readers will attribute
central significance. Second, the narrator establishes a number of material
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facts, including the season, the approximate time of day, and the type of
physical environment, a mucky riverbank somewhere in the countryside.
In sum, as readers survey this cognitive environment, they have the sort
of basic yet incomplete information about physical place, social relations,
and group effort that stimulates further exploratory activity and meaning
construction. In Austin’s terms, we experience (albeit indirectly) the
normal anxiety that motivates the generation of narrative and the pursuit
of closure. Because information is limited at this point in the readers’
experience, they are not hampered by the need to categorize it as useful,
true, or multivalent (for instance, information that is simultaneously literal and metaphorical, like the “soft and mucky” ground underneath the
snow), even if veteran readers of Munro will be suspicious of such surface
simplicity and directness. It is the readers’ assumption, in short, that the
information provided so far is both useful and true.
Research on embodied cognition somewhat modifies earlier theories
of script-based understanding, indicating that while readers “use spatial perspectives to construct mental models of narrative texts,” these
models or simulations are flexible and dynamic. Some research suggests
that the construction of such a model depends on adopting the perspective of a protagonist, a finding that probably has a pronounced bearing
on works that foreground narrative intentions (Gibbs 201, 202–03). In
section one, Munro provides readers with enough information to begin
a cognitive simulation, and the level of narrative competence indicates—
again deceptively—that readers can expect to elaborate on and build this
simulation until it explains the mysterious opening scene. At this point
in “Trespasses,” most readers probably expect two things in the subsequent pages: 1) more narrative information at least glancingly related to
the opening scene on the riverbank, and 2) some developing sense of the
relationships between the characters, which sense entails, typically, developments in the relations between the reader and the characters. Instead,
Munro strategically delays in both respects. Although it is certainly
unlikely that all cognitive narrative simulations require the perspective
of a protagonist, most probably do, because fiction is governed largely by
human considerations (ethical, behavioral, psychological, and so forth),
and because the protagonist provides the means of narrative construal
and thus knowledge. Of course, not all literature invites or encourages
readerly involvement; this is particularly the case with satire and comedy,
because it is distinctly unnatural to identify with the subject of ridicule. By
contrast, opening on a note of mystery, as Munro does, primes the readers’
desire for information and evaluative mechanisms, foremost among them
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an appropriate orienting perspective that will make information pick up
and thus meaning and narrative construal possible.
Munro’s readers hardly meander aimlessly in the beginning of the story
(indeed, could not do so if they chose to), more than willing to collude
with the witty and cheerful narrator. In the long run, Munro thus effects
the double action of the text as the readers, unwittingly hampered by the
initial deprivation of the necessary orienting perspective, belatedly come
into a sobering consciousness of the grim story underneath the narrator’s
delightful chatter, one that mirrors Lauren’s slowly emerging knowledge
of her own submerged history. For the time being, however, readers are
(mis)guided by the chatty and seemingly incidental nature of the narrator’s
discourse. For instance, in the second and third sections and in the beginning of the fourth, the narrator gives the readers a tour of the surface geography of the story, including the town and the house to which the family
has relocated, and in this manner the readers circle, inevitably trespassing,
without the capacity to sort clues along a proper route.
Section two focuses on the old hotel on the main street of the town,
which Harry says he remembers from his summers in the area, and where
he takes his family for dinner soon after they relocate. Much of this second
section is taken up with an exchange between the principal characters
and another family celebrating the anniversary of an elderly couple. The
exchange between the two parties does a good deal to characterize Eileen,
Harry, and (latently) Lauren, but the seemingly incidental quality of the
scene downplays the quality of the information Munro offers. When Harry
asks the couple for “the recipe for a happy marriage,” for instance, the
old man says, “All-eeze keep a foot on er neck,” and all the adults laugh.
While Harry is angling for a way to turn this into an anecdote for the
newspaper, Eileen, once out of earshot, asks, “How do they manage to get
that fat? I don’t understand it. You’d have to eat day and night to get that
fat” (199). As the old man’s joke about control and conflict is deflected
by the superficial preoccupations of Eileen and Harry—a choice anecdote
for the newspaper, the middle-class sophisticate’s shock at obesity and the
canned green beans served in the summer months—Munro introduces
the theme of the suppressed secrets, animosities, and violence in sexual
unions. However, given the seemingly incidental nature of the scene and
the lack of a focalizing perspective, laughing off the old man’s comment
seems forgivable, and it is only in retrospect that readers realize how
much useful information has been offered in a characteristically off-hand
manner. Both as a matter of tone and delayed focalization, then, readers
stand mainly outside the storyworld, identifying with the narrator for the
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time being, since her perspective is the only one that has been offered
thus far. Furthermore, any clues to serious themes and character traits are
deflected by Munro’s modulations into a comic tone, such as her adoption
of free indirect style: “This was the year after Harry had quit his job on
a news-magazine because he was burned out” (198). This comic touch,
which encourages readers to take matters lightly, appears in the first paragraph of the section—a paragraph that is, in fact, nearly all about Harry,
and thus one that keeps readers at the story’s perimeter.
Importantly, readers need not only Lauren’s perspective but also information about the child to construct, ultimately, the significant story in these
thirty-seven pages. But in the second and third sections, the absence of her
necessary focalizing perspective is complemented by a sense of her virtual
absence from the scenes, for the narrator provides little information about
her, so that, in fact, readers nearly forget that she’s in them at all—which
is, of course, sadly the point. In section two, aside from the sentence
that places her in this scene—“He and Eileen and Lauren went there for
dinner on their first Sunday night in town”—the narrator does not mention Lauren, nor does the girl participate in the conversation (198). For all
intents and purposes, she becomes narratively invisible. Like the thematic
continuity between the old man’s remark and the repressed or dark secret
at the story’s center, Lauren’s invisibility attests to the narrator’s neglect
of the protagonist, which repeats at the level of narrative technique, as I
have said, the self-deceptions (and, indeed, general self-absorption) characteristic of Eileen and Harry. Because readers have such limited information, and because the narrator’s wit primarily draws the reader on, Munro
effects a subtle complicity in Lauren’s neglect.
Likewise, readers remain stalled at the story’s perimeter in the third
section, which provides a succinct narrative summary of the transformation of the hotel dining room into a coffee shop by the new owner, Mr.
Palagian, who hires an as-yet-unidentified woman (in fact, Delphine) to
work for him. The last third of this section veers into a comic portrait of
Harry as Munro indulges again in free indirect style:
He was hoping that one day Mr. Palagian would thaw out and tell
the story of his life. Harry kept a file full of ideas for books and was
always on the lookout for life stories. Someone like Mr. Palagian—or
even that fat tough-talking waitress, he said—could be harboring a
contemporary tragedy or adventure which would make a best seller.
The thing about life, Harry had told Lauren, was to live in the
world with interest. To keep your eyes open and see the possibili-
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ties—see the humanity—in everybody you met. To be aware. If he
had anything at all to teach her it was that. Be aware. (201)
Though entertained by the echo of Harry’s pretentious blathering in these
paragraphs, readers are nonetheless sensitively directed to note the longsuffering addressee (“he said”; “Harry had told Lauren”), and also, to mark
the repeated, emphatic, and final command (“Be aware”), quite as though
the author is speaking over her characters and narrator and directly to her
readers.
Four pages into the story, then, readers are apt to experience a sense
of present and perhaps ultimate shapelessness—inconsequential and forgotten characters (such as Delphine), unnecessary information, dangling
mystery—and no clear starting point from which to begin assembling a
unified narrative. Perhaps for readers, a low-level epistemic frustration
replaces full-blown anxiety, because, after all, we are not at risk for direct
consequences, and because we are so far innocent regarding the truly
sordid subject of the story. But sure enough, this is the transitional section. First, following on the final paragraph of section three (above), section four brings the focus gradually onto Lauren (who is, just subsequent
to this, fully established as the protagonist and the orienting perspective
in section five). Second, as the narrator directs the readers’ attention to
Lauren in the second paragraph of section four, a shift in both tone and
subject matter prepares readers for the perspective they have so far been
denied. Signaling Lauren’s presence as implied auditor at the close of
section three and commanding attention—“Be aware” (or warning the
readers?: beware)—the narrator next gives the girl pride of place, the first
sentence in section four, but then, like a busy magpie, having unearthed
Lauren, immediately tosses her aside for a brighter treasure: “Lauren made
her own breakfast, usually cereal with maple syrup instead of milk. Eileen
took her coffee back to bed and drank it slowly. She didn’t want to talk. She
had to get herself in gear to face the day, working in the newspaper office”
(201). But readers (who surely think Lauren is older than her ten years
until nearly halfway through the story) have registered the twin signs of
neglect, Lauren’s repulsive repast and Eileen’s sluggish maternal transmission. Importantly, although the narrative is not yet focalized within
Lauren’s perspective, readers, no longer tracing the town’s perimeter, are
peering into the inner territory of the story, the family home; in keeping
with this, the nature and quantity of information available is accordingly
constrained. Thus, while this paragraph, like the final paragraphs of sec-
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tion three about Harry, is still humorous, it is less so than the story in section two, because it attests to Eileen’s utter self-absorption.
The second paragraph of section four moves subtly away from the focus
on Harry and Eileen and toward Lauren as it describes the location of the
house (the edge of town) and, in some detail, Lauren’s solitary autumn
afternoons, carrying refuse to Harry’s nascent compost heap. In this
manner, the new sense of focus on the isolated child and, with it, the shift
to a setting (creepily foreshadowing the final scene on the riverbank) prepare readers for the next paragraph, which initiates Lauren’s perspective:
Her life was a lot different now from the way it had been just a few
weeks ago, when she and Harry and Eileen were driving to one of
the lakes to swim in the hot afternoons. Then later in the evenings,
she and Harry had gone on adventure walks around the town, while
Eileen sanded and painted and wall-papered the house, claiming
she could do that faster and better on her own. All that she had
wanted Harry to do then was to get all his boxes of papers and his
filing cabinet and desk into a ratty little room in the basement, out
of her way. Lauren had helped him. (202)
With this paragraph, Munro modulates the narrative voice, so that the
teller, having guided readers into the house and physical territory of this
story, identifies her protagonist and focuses within Lauren’s perspective,
simultaneously relinquishing her tour-guide function in the service of a
higher goal. Exactly how much readers gather of the surprising fund of
information available through this subtly sudden act of orientation cannot
be precisely claimed, but it is surely at this point that a perspective, a
fictionally perceiving self, is finally available from which to survey the
quality and kinds of information provided and actively to begin construing
a narrative of value.
Following on the previous paragraph’s portrait of the solitary Lauren
traipsing toward the compost heap in the autumnal afternoon, the first
independent clause of this paragraph strikes a note of conscious awareness and melancholy, prepared by the previous paragraph but nevertheless
at odds with the sense of the characters (remember: mainly Harry and
Eileen) thus far. In so doing, it establishes a theme of role reversal between
Lauren and her parents that readers finally clearly register, as they navigate, along with Lauren, between her mother and her father and the primarily human information that governs her life: Harry’s childishness (“she
and Harry had gone on adventure walks around the town”); the thinly
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veiled tensions between the parents (Eileen’s vicious renovations while
Harry and Lauren adventure; Harry’s place in the basement). “Her life was
a lot different now from the way it was just a few weeks ago”: the clause
seems deeper than it is, precisely because the story’s narrative technique
no longer mimics Harry and Eileen’s self-deception, focusing readers on a
vulnerable character who, so unlike her parents, is sensible to loneliness,
transition, and loss.
In theorizing how our human ecological cognition operates within
narrative, I have said four salient features of our evolved psychology
have high importance: a fictional “self” that serves to orient; a capacity
for association, but especially causal (and hence narrative) construal;
an environment rich in information (potential affordances); and a social
group. In “Trespasses,” once Munro initiates Lauren’s focal perspective,
the problem of informational evaluation that besets readers in the first
three sections is solved, because orientation and territory are mutually
related phenomena. This goes back to and, I believe, reinforces Phelan’s
point about our readerly commitment to character functions. Put simply,
we can learn from characters in a way that we cannot learn from narrators, because characters are (for the most part) limited in ways that we are
as living humans. Narrative omniscience may well be a fiction, but many
narrators, like Munro’s here, are physically and otherwise unconstrained,
so they are fairly useless as epistemic guides for readers.
In the relationship of Lauren’s just-focalized perspective to just-defined
territory, the disposition of information in the environment is, in the subsequent scene, sudden and relentless in its informational relevance. Down
in the basement, Lauren lifts the peculiar box.
“Now,” he said. “Now, Lauren. I could make up some kind of lie
to tell you, but I am going to tell you the truth. Because I believe
that children should be told the truth. At least by the time they’re
your age, they should be. But in this case it has to be secret. Okay?”
Lauren said, “Okay.” Something made her wish, already, that he
wouldn’t do this. (203)
Once readers have been offered the self via whom they will construe the
narrative, they follow closely but also depart from the character in judgments and narrative shaping. In Munro’s text, the process begins at this
juncture, when Lauren’s innocent question brings down upon her the
gruesome story of the first baby’s death. Lauren cannot use this information; in ecological terms, it is not, for her, an affordance, an opportunity
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for action. By contrast, it is extraordinarily useful to readers, who feel no
compunction about, for instance, judging Harry for his parental irresponsibility and deviousness, and for building that judgment into the story.
Were I to conduct a complete analysis of readers’ narrative construal
of the story, I would elucidate further this relationship to Lauren, who
cannot herself take information, like readers, and shape it into a story. She
is simply stuck with it, and with the increased load of anxiety that comes
from too much slightly conflicting information of a kind particularly inassimilable for a child. Munro brilliantly builds on informational ambiguity
and anxiety through the progress of the Lauren-Delphine relationship in
sections eight through eleven, which confuse not just facts but familialsocial relationships, thus developing the complexity of the information
that Lauren and the readers must process.
Toward the end of the story, protagonist and readers share an exhaustion with the closely related versions of events and with the insistence that
each version be told. In the last hashing-out of the story of the dead baby,
Eileen reveals that she and Harry had been arguing about an abortion just
before the accident. Against Harry’s objections, Eileen insists that Lauren
can now handle this truth:
“Yes, but it’s true,” Eileen said. “Lauren can take it, she knows it
wasn’t like it was her.”
Lauren spoke up, surprising herself.
“It was me,” she said. “Who was it if it wasn’t me?” (232)
To the best of the readers’ knowledge, Lauren’s statement is factually correct, since Harry has provided documentation to prove to Delphine that
Lauren is his and Eileen’s biological child. While Munro may manipulate,
for a time, our hyper-narrativizing tendency in the story, and while the
fact that Eileen was pregnant with Lauren does matter to the girl, on some
level, no facts seem to matter at all any more, at least not to this reader.
For what seems overwhelmingly clear is that all accounts provided by
the adults are continuous and relentless acts of self-assertion that isolate
Lauren from her peers and now confuse her sense of family and origin.
“You are a kid that is not short of information,” Delphine tells Lauren,
just as she’s about to give her more that Lauren would do well without
(220). As my overview of ecological cognition has suggested, for all
human beings, the social efficacy of our environment is a precondition to
our ability to orient and wayfind within the physical terrain. This is especially so for children, whose social lives and beings are governed by their
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families, which typically manage the flow of information to the children.
In “Trespasses,” Harry and Eileen perform no such function, instead overloading their child with burdensome information, a child, furthermore,
whose selfhood they have not even bothered to acknowledge. For readers,
the ethical and the aesthetic meet up as soon as they realize Munro’s initial
technique of disorientation mimics the ecological fragility of self, perspective, and life story for Lauren. I hope that the ecological ground of my
discussion has deepened my readers’ sense of the relationship between
Munro’s technique and the human meaning of her story.1

University of New Orleans
Note
1 I am grateful to Anne Boyd, Catherine Loomis, Doreen Piano, and Elizabeth Steeby, the
members of our working writers group at the University of New Orleans, for their helpful
comments on a draft of this essay.
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